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Abstract 
Moral judgment depends upon inferences about agents’ 
beliefs, desires, and intentions. Here, we argue that in 
addition to these factors, people take into account the moral 
optimality of an action. Three experiments show that even 
agents who are ignorant about the nature of their moral 
decisions are held accountable for the quality of their 
decision—a kind of behaviorist thinking, in that such 
reasoning bypasses the agent’s mental states. In particular, 
whereas optimal choices are seen as more praiseworthy 
than suboptimal choices, decision quality has no further 
effect on moral judgments—a highly suboptimal choice is 
seen as no worse than a marginally suboptimal choice. 
These effects held up for judgments of wrongness and 
punishment (Experiment 1), positive and negative 
outcomes (Experiment 2), and agents with positive and 
negative intentions (Experiment 3). We argue that these 
results reflect a broader tendency to irresistibly apply the 
Efficiency Principle when explaining behavior. 
Keywords: Moral judgment; theory of mind; causal 
reasoning; intentionality; lay decision theory. 
Introduction 
We judge others’ actions on the basis of what they were 
thinking. If Megan cheats on an exam, we wish to know 
why she did it. If Joey made a hurtful remark, our opinion 
of him depends on whether he knew that his remark 
would be taken that way. We hold others accountable for 
their actions largely as a function of their intent—the joint 
product of their knowledge and goals (Dennett, 1987). 
This link between mindreading and moral judgment has 
been extensively studied in psychology (e.g., Cushman, 
2008) and is enshrined in the law (Mikhail, 2007).  
Yet, in some contexts, some of the functions of 
mindreading can be accomplished using mechanisms that 
do not actually involve reasoning about beliefs and 
desires. We might infer that the car to our right will 
change lanes on the basis of the assumed beliefs and 
desires of the car’s driver; but more likely, we simply 
look at the car’s blinker and read the car’s future behavior 
off of the world directly. More generally, we often can 
predict behavior accurately by assuming that agents will 
behave optimally relative to assumed common goals (such 
as not colliding with other cars) and assumed common 
knowledge (the geometry of driving). This is known as 
taking the teleological stance (Dennett, 1987). 
Infants can use situational information to predict the 
behavior of animate agents, well before they can perform 
explicit mental state computations. For example, infants 
are surprised if agents take an inefficient path between 
two locations; if an agent does take an inefficient path 
around an occluder, they expect an obstacle to be revealed 
behind the occluder (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). That is, 
infants apply the Efficiency Principle, assuming that 
agents behave optimally relative to situational constraints. 
The Efficiency Principle is a fundamental principle 
which even adults use for predicting and explaining 
behavior (Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009; Johnson & 
Rips, 2015). Indeed, this principle is so ingrained in 
cognition that it can lead to behaviorist thinking, wherein 
even agents who are ignorant of their situational 
constraints are assumed to behave optimally relative to 
them. In one study (Johnson & Rips, 2014), participants 
read about agents making decisions under uncertainty. For 
example, Jill is deciding which of three shampoos to buy, 
wanting to make her hair smell like apples. She believes 
that all three brands have the same likelihood of achieving 
this goal, but in fact the three brands differ in quality—
one has a 70% chance, one has a 50% chance, and one has 
a 30% chance. In reality, of course, Jill is equally likely to 
choose any of the three options, since, due to her 
ignorance, she has no basis for choosing one over another. 
But participants seem to ignore Jill’s ignorance, and use 
knowledge about the world to predict her decision: They 
predict that she will choose the optimal (70%) option 
rather than the suboptimal (50% or 30%) options. Most 
strikingly, even though participants judge the optimal 
(70%) option to be her most likely choice, they believe 
that the suboptimal 50% and 30% options are equally 
likely—that is, they use the Efficiency Principle. Even 
though the probability of the outcome differs just as much 
between the 70% and 50% options as between the 50% 
and 30% options, only the 70% option is optimal or 
efficient. Like infants, adults appear to use efficiency-
based behaviorist thinking in understanding behavior. 
In the current paper, we tested whether people use 
behaviorist thinking in moral judgment. If moral 
judgment depends on mindreading as such, they may not, 
since behaviorist thinking is an alternative, non-
mentalistic strategy for understanding behavior. But if 
moral judgment instead depends on whatever tools we use 
for predicting and explaining behavior, behaviorist 
principles might seep into the moral realm. 
This question was examined in three experiments. In all 
cases, agents made morally laden decisions in which (a) 
three potential options differed in quality, but (b) agents 
falsely believed that the options were equivalent. If 
people use the same behaviorist logic in moral judgment 
that they use to understand behavior in other cases, we 
would expect them to base their moral judgments on the 
quality of the agent’s choice, even though the agents were 
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ignorant. Further, if this behaviorist thinking is a 
consequence of the Efficiency Principle, we would expect 
participants to give more lenient moral judgments only if 
an agent made an optimal choice; we would not expect 
moral judgments to differ between suboptimal choices 
that varied equally in quality. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we tested for moral behaviorism in 
judgments of wrongness and of punishment. To vary the 
actual quality of the choice while leaving the agent’s 
beliefs and intentions constant, participants were told that 
the agent had a false belief. One vignette read (material in 
brackets varied across vignettes, between-subjects): 
A doctor working in a hospital has a patient who is 
having hearing problems. This patient has three, and 
only three, treatment options. The doctor believes 
that all treatment options have a 70% chance of 
giving the patient a full, successful recovery. But in 
fact the doctor’s belief is wrong. Actually: 
1) If she gives the patient treatment LPN, there is a 
70% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
2) If she gives the patient treatment PTY, there is a 
50% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
3) If she gives the patient treatment NRW, there is a 
30% chance the patient will have a full recovery. 
The doctor chooses treatment [LPN/PTY/NRW], and 
the patient does not recover at all. The patient now 
has permanent hearing loss. 
That is, the moral agent (here, the doctor) had three 
choices, which she believed to be of equal quality, but 
which in fact varied. We refer to the 70% option as Best, 
the 50% option as Middle, and the 30% option as Worst. 
Note that the probabilistic difference between Best and 
Middle is the same as that between Middle and Worst, but 
that only Best maximizes the probability of the outcome. 
That is, Best is the optimal decision, even though the 
doctor has no way of knowing this. 
Participants were asked, given the negative outcome, to 
rate either the wrongness of the agent’s action or the 
extent to which the agent should be punished. One 
possibility is that only punishment judgments would be 
influenced by the probability of the outcome, because 
prior work has found that the degree to which an agent is 
deemed punishable is primarily a function of the agent’s 
causal contribution to that outcome (Cushman, 2008). To 
the extent that the agent made the outcome more 
probable, she should be judged more causal (Cheng, 
1997; Johnson & Rips, 2013), and hence more deserving 
of punishment. In that case, agents should be seen as more 
deserving of punishment when they choose Worst than 
when they choose Middle, and more when they choose 
Middle than when they choose Best. However, because 
judgments of wrongness tend to track intentions rather 
than causation (Cushman, 2008), we would expect no 
differences in wrongness judgments between agents who 
choose Best, Middle, or Worst. 
Another possibility, however, is that people use 
behaviorist thinking when judging both punishment and 
wrongness, because people apply the Efficiency Principle 
to all agents, even agents who lack critical information 
about their decision situation (Johnson & Rips, 2014). 
That is, if people have a tacit expectation that moral 
agents behave optimally, then judgments of both 
wrongness and punishment could track the optimality of 
an action. Thus, we would always expect more favorable 
moral judgments when agents choose Best rather than  
Middle, since Best is optimal while Middle is suboptimal, 
but we would expect little or no difference between 
choosing Middle and Worst, since both are suboptimal. 
Method 
We recruited 336 participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk; 80 were excluded because they incorrectly 
answered one or more check questions. 
Participants were assigned to one of eight vignettes 
(doctor, farmer, contractor, programmer, pilot, paramedic, 
CEO, or investment broker), formatted as above. The 
agent was always ignorant about the quality of the Best 
(70% chance of a positive outcome), Middle (50% 
chance), and Worst (30% chance) options. After choosing 
either the Best, Middle, or Worst option (between-
subjects), the decision always led to a negative outcome. 
On the same page, participants answered either a 
question about wrongness (e.g., “How wrong was the 
doctor’s behavior”) or punishment (“How much should 
the doctor be punished”), on a continuous scale (1 = “not 
at all”, 4 = “somewhat”, 7 = “very much”). Thus, the 
design of the experiment was 8 (vignette) x 3 (choice: 
Best, Middle, or Worst) x 2 (DV: wrongness or 
punishment), with all factors between-subjects. 
On the next page, participants were asked two check 
questions, to ensure they had understood the vignette. One 
question concerned the agent’s knowledge (e.g., “Did the 
doctor know about the actual chances of success for each 
of the options?”) and the other question concerned the 
agent’s choice (“What was the actual chance of success 
for the option which the doctor chose?”). Because our 
hypotheses are predicated on the assumption that 
participants understand the agent’s knowledge state and 
choice, any participant who made an error on either 
question was excluded from analysis.  
Results and Discussion 
In all vignettes, agents made their decision under the false 
belief that all decision options were of equal quality. 
Thus, the agents’ mental states were identical across the 
three conditions of the experiment. Further, a negative 
result occurred in all cases, so the outcome was also 
identical across conditions. Yet, Figure 1 shows that 
participants’ judgments of both wrongness and 
punishment differed depending on the agent’s choice.  
For wrongness judgments, the agents who chose the 
(optimal) Best option were judged more leniently than 
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those who chose the (suboptimal) Middle option [M = 
2.30, SD = 1.71 vs. M = 4.30, SD = 1.90; t(87) = -5.22, p 
< .001, d = -1.11, BF10 > 1000]. Likewise, agents who 
chose the Best option were judged less deserving of 
punishment than those who chose the Middle option [M = 
2.33, SD = 1.54 vs. M = 3.62, SD = 1.48; t(74) = -3.71, p 
< .001, d = -0.85, BF10 = 64.8].1 These large differences 
held up despite the agents’ ignorance and despite the 
ultimately negative outcome, indicating that people base 
their moral judgments not only on the agents’ mental 
states and the extremity of the outcome, but also on the 
agent’s optimality. Thus, people appear to use behaviorist 
thinking in their moral evaluations. 
However, participants’ moral judgments did not differ 
between different suboptimal choices. Wrongness 
judgments were no less harsh when agents chose the 
Middle option than when they chose the Worst option [M 
= 4.30, SD = 1.90 vs. M = 4.19, SD = 1.97; t(86) = 0.28, p 
= .78, d = 0.06, BF01 = 5.90], nor were punishment 
judgments [M = 3.62, SD = 1.48 vs. M = 4.20, SD = 1.79; 
t(84) = -1.61, p = .11, d = -0.35, BF01 = 1.83]. These null 
effects—with evidence favoring the null hypothesis, 
according to the Bayes Factor analyses—are remarkable 
in light of the very large differences between the Best and 
Middle conditions, which had just as large of a difference 
in efficacy (a 70% vs. 50% chance of a positive outcome) 
as the difference between the Middle and Worst 
conditions (50% vs. 30%). Most importantly, these null 
effects reveal the same pattern of results as Johnson and 
Rips (2014) found in people’s predictions and 
explanations for (non-moral) decisions. Finding a 
difference between optimal and suboptimal choices, but 
no difference between two different suboptimal choices of 
different efficacy suggests that participants’ behaviorist 
                                                
1 All t-tests reported in this paper are supplemented with a Bayes 
Factor (BF) with a scale factor of 1 (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, & Iverson, 2009). For example, “BF10 = 4.0” means that 
the data would be 4 times likelier under the alternative 
hypothesis than under the null hypothesis, giving reason to reject 
the null hypothesis. However, BFs can also quantify evidence in 
favor of a null hypothesis; “BF01 = 6.0” means that the data 
would be 6 times likelier under the null than under the 
alternative, giving reason to accept the null hypothesis. 
thinking is rooted in efficiency-based reasoning, for 
which optimality is the key constraint. 
A skeptic might raise two concerns about this 
interpretation. First, rather than blaming agents directly 
for choosing suboptimally, participants could instead have 
blamed the agents for their ignorance itself. This would 
not necessarily constitute behaviorist thinking, since 
agents’ ignorance could be thought of as a failure to act 
with due diligence. Experiment 2 addressed this concern. 
A second way that these findings could reflect mental 
state inferences would be if participants were using the 
agents’ actions to infer their goals. If an agent chooses 
suboptimally, perhaps she did not want a positive 
outcome to occur. Experiment 3 addressed this concern. 
Experiment 2 
We had two goals in Experiment 2. First, we addressed a 
possible concern about Experiment 1—that participants 
may have held the agents accountable not for their 
suboptimal choice, but for the ignorance that led to that 
choice. Although this possibility would not a priori 
predict the pattern of results we found in Experiment 1 
(since the agents were ignorant in all conditions), perhaps 
participants were willing to forgive the agents for their 
ignorance when they were fortunate enough to have 
chosen optimally (a possibility reminiscent of the 
outcome bias; Baron & Hershey, 1988). To avoid this 
concern, we added a sentence to each vignette indicating 
that the agent had arrived at their (mistaken) opinion 
about the decision options after undertaking extensive 
research. Thus, the agents in Experiment 2 have done 
their due diligence to understand their decisions. 
Second, we wanted to test whether people apply 
behaviorist thinking in light of both positive and negative 
outcomes. Because people tend to make harsher moral 
evaluations in light of negative outcomes than positive 
outcomes (Baron & Hershey, 1988), perhaps all’s well 
that ends well—the quality of the agent’s decision may be 
seen as irrelevant when the outcome is positive. 
Method 
We recruited 267 participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk; 67 were excluded because they incorrectly 
answered one or more check questions.  
Vignettes were the same as those in Experiment 1, 
except that they indicated that the agent had undertaken 
extensive research before making her decision. For 
example, in the doctor vignette, the third sentence from 
Experiment 1 was replaced with: 
Based on many articles that the doctor has carefully 
read in respected medical journals, she truly believes 
that all three options have a 70% chance of giving 
the patient a full, successful recovery. 
The only other difference in the vignettes was that the 
outcome could be negative, as in Experiment 1 (e.g., 
“…the patient does not recover at all. The patient now has 
permanent hearing loss”) or positive (“…the patient 
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Figure 1: Results of Experiment 1. Bars represent 1 SE. 
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recovers. The patient has no permanent hearing loss”). 
The design was thus 8 (vignette) x 3 (choice: Best, 
Middle, or Worst) x 2 (outcome: positive or negative), 
with all factors between-subjects. 
On the same page, participants answered, “What does 
the doctor deserve to receive for her behavior?” on a scale 
from 1 (“extreme blame”) to 9 (“extreme praise”). On the 
following page, participants answered the same check 
questions used in Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 2 shows that for both positive and negative 
outcomes, participants again gave more positive moral 
judgments for agents choosing the (optimal) Best option 
compared to the (suboptimal) Middle or Worst options. 
Specifically, participants assigned more moral praise to 
agents who chose Best than those who chose Middle, for 
positive outcomes [M = 6.71, SD = 1.42 vs. M = 5.22, SD 
= 1.68; t(61) = 3.80, p < .001, d = 0.96, BF10 = 78.0] and 
for negative outcomes [M = 4.37, SD = 1.54 vs. M = 3.25, 
SD = 1.40; t(64) = 3.08, p < .001, d = 0.76, BF10 = 11.3]. 
That is, participants attended not only to the outcome and 
to the agent’s mental states, but also to the quality of the 
agent’s choice. This was true even though the agents were 
ignorant of the true quality of the possible options, and 
had taken extensive efforts to be knowledgeable. 
Yet, just as in Experiment 1, the Middle and Worst 
options did not differ, even though the probability of the 
outcome differed just as much between Middle and Worst 
as between Best and Middle. Agents who chose Middle 
were rated no more praiseworthy than those who chose 
Worse, whether the outcome was positive [M = 5.22, SD 
= 1.68 vs. M = 4.65, SD = 1.76; t(64) = 1.35, p = .18, d = 
0.33, BF01 = 2.4] or negative [M = 3.25, SD = 1.40 vs. M 
= 2.97, SD = 1.48; t(71) = 0.82, p = .42, d = 0.19, BF01 = 
4.1]. Thus, once again, participants appear to be basing 
their moral evaluations off of optimality, rather than the 
probability of the outcome, since Best differed in 
optimality from Middle and Worst, whereas all three 
options differed equally in probability. This suggests that 
participants are applying the Efficiency Principle to the 
ignorant moral decision-makers. 
Participants also used the outcome (positive or 
negative) in their moral judgments, assigning more praise 
for positive outcomes than for negative outcomes [M = 
5.49, SD = 1.83 vs. M = 3.48, SD = 1.57; t(198) = 8.38, p 
< .001, d = 1.19, BF10 > 1000], even given precisely the 
same choice on the part of the agent, as shown in Figure 
2. This is consistent with Baron and Hershey’s (1988) 
demonstrations of the outcome bias. Given the robustness 
of the outcome bias in the moral psychology literature, it 
is worth noting that the effect of optimality (d = 0.96 for 
positive outcomes and d = 0.76 for negative outcomes) 
approached the effect size of the outcome bias (d = 1.19;  
see also Figure 2 for means).  
These results cast doubt on the possibility that people 
are holding the agents accountable because of their 
ignorance, rather than because of their choice. Because 
the agents in Experiment 2 took appropriate steps to 
secure their knowledge, it is unlikely that participants 
believed their ignorance to be a moral failing.  
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, we addressed the possibility that 
participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were interpreting the 
agents’ choices as reflecting their goals—optimal 
decisions could have signaled a positive or beneficent 
intention, whereas suboptimal decisions could have 
signaled a negative or malevolent intention. Once again, it 
is unclear on this account why a highly suboptimal choice 
would not signal a worse intention than a moderately 
suboptimal choice. Nonetheless, we avoided this concern 
in Experiment 3 by specifying that the agents had either a 
positive intention (to achieve the morally mandated goal) 
or a negative intention (not to achieve it). If we continue 
to find similar effects across conditions, this would 
suggest that participants are relying on the efficiency of 
the agent’s choice in a behaviorist manner, rather than 
relying on inferences about the agent’s intentions. 
Method 
We recruited 335 participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk; 124 were excluded because they incorrectly 
answered one or more check questions. 
The vignettes were the same as those used in 
Experiment 2, except that a sentence was added 
immediately before the third sentence, specifying either a 
positive intent (e.g., “The doctor intends to choose the 
best treatment option for her patient”) or a negative intent 
(“The doctor does not intend to choose the best treatment 
option for her patient”). The design was thus 8 (vignette) 
x 3 (choice: Best, Middle, or Worst) x 2 (goal: positive or 
negative), with all factors between-subjects. The 
dependent measure was the same as in Experiment 2. 
On the following page, participants answered the same 
check questions used in Experiment 2, in addition to a 
third question about the agent’s intent (e.g., “Did the 
doctor intend to choose the best treatment option for her 
patient?”). As in the other experiments, participants were 
excluded for answering any check question incorrectly. 
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Results and Discussion 
Whether the agents had positive or negative intentions, 
participants assigned more praise (or less blame) to the 
optimal than to the suboptimal moral decision-makers, 
replicating the same pattern as Experiments 1 and 2 (see 
Figure 3). The difference in blame/praise judgments 
between Best and Middle was robust both when the agent 
had positive intentions [M = 5.11, SD = 1.72 vs. M = 3.95, 
SD = 0.99; t(76) = 3.66, p < .001, d = 0.83, BF10 = 56.4] 
and when the agent had negative intentions [M = 4.17, SD 
= 1.72 vs. M = 3.11, SD = 3.11, SD = 1.41; t(65) = 2.77, p 
= .007, d = 0.68, BF10 = 5.3]. Yet, just as in previous 
experiments, there was no difference in praise judgments 
between agents who chose Middle and those who chose 
worst, either for positively intentioned [M = 3.95, SD = 
0.99 vs. M = 3.87, SD = 1.55; t(68) = 0.27, p = .78, d = 
0.07, BF01 = 5.3] or negatively intentioned agents [M = 
3.11, SD = 1.41 vs. M = 2.78, SD = 1.17; t(71) = 1.09, p = 
.28, d = 0.25, BF01 = 3.3].  
Just as Experiment 2 showed that the effect of optimal 
versus suboptimal choice is of nearly comparable size to 
the effect of positive versus negative outcomes, we can 
compare the effect of optimal choice to the effect of 
intention. Although there was a sizeable effect of positive 
versus negative intention [M = 4.33, SD = 1.53 vs. M = 
3.30, SD = 1.53; t(209) = 4.89, p < .001, d = 0.67, BF10 > 
1000], the effect size of Best versus Middle difference 
was, if anything, even larger (d = 0.83 for positive 
intentions and d = 0.68 for negative intentions). 
Because similar effects of optimality were found in 
Experiment 3, even when the agents’ positive or negative 
intentions were specified explicitly, it seems that the 
effect of optimality is not due to tacit inferences about the 
agents’ goals. Together with Experiment 2, this seems to 
foreclose on the possibility that participants’ judgments 
were driven by mental state inferences. Instead, 
participants appear to use the Efficiency Principle in 
moral judgment, just as they do when they explain 
behavior in other domains (Johnson & Rips, 2014). 
   
General Discussion 
Our moral judgments depend on how we explain the 
behavior of moral agents. We often understand others’ 
behavior by mindreading or mental-state inference (e.g., 
Heider, 1958). But in other contexts, people seem to skip 
past inferences about mental states, instead predicting and 
explaining behavior based on information immediately 
perceptible in the world (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; 
Johnson & Rips, 2014). Do people also use such 
behaviorist or teleological thinking in moral judgment? 
The current studies show that people do. People reliably 
gave more lenient moral judgments to agents who acted 
optimally (choosing the best of three options, with respect 
to a morally laden outcome) than to agents who acted 
suboptimally, even though the agents were ignorant about 
the quality of the options. Further, the degree of 
suboptimality did not matter (choosing the second-best or 
worst of the options). This pattern reflects use of the 
Efficiency Principle—the expectation that agents will act 
optimally relative to their situational constraints (Dennett, 
1987). Yet, use of this principle was unjustified, because 
the agents were ignorant about these constraints. This 
pattern was replicated across six independent samples of 
participants (Experiments 1–3), and matches findings in 
previous studies of social cognition (Johnson & Rips, 
2014). These findings both demonstrate behaviorist 
reasoning (since people base their moral judgments on the 
ignorant agents’ choice) and pinpoint the Efficiency 
Principle as the mechanism (since people distinguish only 
between optimal and suboptimal choices).  
Could a less radical, mindreading-based account also 
explain these findings? First, could participants have 
imbued the agent with knowledge of the options, despite 
the wording of the vignettes? It is unlikely that 
participants were misreading the materials, because 
participants were asked explicitly whether the agent was 
knowledgeable, and participants answering this question 
incorrectly were excluded from analysis. But could 
participants have been making a subtler mistake, 
confusing their own perspective with that of the agent 
(Birch & Bloom, 2007)? This possibility is also unlikely, 
because it would also predict a difference between 
different suboptimal choices (i.e., between Middle and 
Worst), which was not found in any of the experiments. In 
fact, Johnson and Rips (2014) compared people’s 
inferences about knowledgeable and ignorant agents, and 
found that participants do distinguish between different 
suboptimal options when the agents are knowledgeable. 
(This finding also rules out the possibility that participants 
may have misinterpreted the probabilities because of a 
framing effect or probabilistic reasoning fallacy, since 
those fallacies would apply equally to reasoning about 
knowledgeable and ignorant agents.) 
Our experiments also addressed two other ways that 
participants’ moral judgments might be based on mental-
state considerations. Experiment 2 speaks against the 
possibility that participants were blaming participants not 
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for their actions, but for their ignorance. In that study, the 
agents were said to have undertaken extensive research in 
coming to their beliefs, so that they had done their due 
diligence. Furthermore, we conducted an additional 
follow-up study, finding that participants applied the 
Efficiency Principle even when they were told that the 
probabilities were literally unknowable. 
Experiment 3 addressed the possibility that people take 
the agents’ choices to tacitly signal their intentions. Note, 
however, that even this explanation would still involve 
behaviorist thinking in that the ignorant agents could not 
have used the decision qualities in forming their 
intentions. Nonetheless, participants continued to make 
efficiency-based moral judgments even when the agents’ 
intentions were explicitly stated in the vignettes. 
A final concern is that our experiments may lack the 
statistical power to detect an effect of the Middle versus 
Worst choice, because this effect may be smaller than the 
effect of Best versus Middle. Although the Bayes Factors 
favoring the null hypothesis speak against this possibility, 
we further ruled out this concern with a follow-up study, 
using a within-subjects design and tripled sample size per 
cell. This high-power study revealed an identical pattern. 
These results have implications for both moral 
psychology and for social cognition more broadly. In  
moral psychology, these results add efficiency to the set 
of heuristics that people use for moral reasoning 
(Sunstein, 2005). Further, they show that the role of 
behavior understanding in moral judgment goes beyond 
mindreading, to encompass the full range of tools that 
humans use for interpreting behavior (Dennett, 1987). 
More generally, these results reinforce the fundamental 
place of the Efficiency Principle in social cognition. 
Efficiency considerations have been shown to play a role 
in infants’ action understanding (Gergely & Csibra, 
2003), in the perception of animacy (Gao & Scholl, 
2011), in predicting agents’ spatial trajectories (Baker et 
al., 2009), and in lay theories of decision-making 
(Johnson & Rips, 2013, 2014, 2015). The current results 
underscore the central explanatory role of efficiency, by 
extending this principle to moral judgment.  
These results may also have widespread practical 
implications. Legal courts are often responsible for 
assessing culpability when a defendant was ignorant of 
some important aspect of their case. For instance, after the 
L’Aquila earthquake in Italy, six scientists were charged 
with manslaughter, even though it is impossible to 
accurately predict an earthquake (Cartlidge, 2009); and 
similar lawsuits have arisen in cases of negligence in 
gynecology and other medical practices, sometimes 
involving millions of dollars (e.g. Raghuveer, 2015). 
The current work found that behaviorist thinking 
accounts for moral judgments in the complete absence of 
mental state information—an especially strong test of the 
behaviorism hypothesis. Future work should explore how 
and to what extent behaviorist thinking interacts with 
mindreading in moral judgments, and in what ways it 
extends to other domains of social cognition (see Johnson 
& Rips, 2014 for initial proposals). 
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